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IS REFERENTIAL LEGISLATION WORTH WHILEt
BY HORACE EMERSON READ*
DEFINITION

T

purpose of this article is to examine and weigh some
problems engendered alike for lawyers and laymen by the
legislative device of incorporating terms in a statute merely by
reference to other law, in other words, to canvass the question
posed in the title. There has been occasional comment on use
of the device, ranging from violent condemnation to qualified
approval, but objective discussion has been rare and fragmentary.'
The writer proposes to avoid deficiency as well as depart from
the traditionally insular treatment of law by referring to the
recorded experience of the four principal common law countries.
As Sir Courtney Ilbert has remarked:
"All legislation is obviously referential in the widest sense. No
statute is completely intelligible as an isolated enactment. Every
statute is a chapter, or a fragment of a chapter, of a body of law.
It involves references, express or implied, to the rules of the common law, and to the provisions of other statutes bearing on the
same subject."'
But the narrower, technical meaning with which the courts have
come to use the term is precise. It designates a statute original
in form, neither amendatory nor supplementary, which refers to
HE

*Professor of Law. Law School. University of Minnesota.
tThis article appeared in the Canadian Bar Review for June, 1940, 18
Can. Bar Rev. 415. Footnote references have been expanded to include additional American material.
'E.g. see Report of a Select Committee of the House of Commons of
1875, to investigate "whether any and what means can be adopted to improve the manner and language of current legislation." 1875, Cmd. 208;
Legislation by Reference, (1932) Scots L. T. 1.See also Thring, Practical Legislation (1902) 55-56; The Queen v. Eaton, (1881) 8 Q. B. D.
158, 51 L. J. Q. B. 273; Livingston v. Mayor of Westminster, [1904] 2
K. B. 109, 73 L. J.K. B. 434; Willingdale v. Norris, [19091 1 K. B. 57,
78 L. J.K. B. 69.
-Ilbert, Legislative Methods and Forms (1901) 254.
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and by reference adopts, wholly or partially, for its own purposes,
one or more provisions of other statutes or one or more precepts
of the common law.3
While the term does not, when used strictly, include expressly amending and repealing acts, it is sometimes loosely used
to include them since they necessarily refer to pre-existing law.
This latter usage has sometimes led both to confused thinking
on the part of persons who have discussed the incorporation of
terms by reference and, as shall be seen, to difficulties of interpretation.

4

Reference legislation in both the strict and loose sense is
well founded historically. The device of affecting provisions of
earlier law merely by reference to them was in use by the
English parliament at least by the thirteenth century 5 and
received the sanction of Chief justice Beresford in 1310. 6 Ever
since, despite sporadic criticism, there has been an increasing
tendency to enact statutes which borrow precepts from the common law or other legislation or even repeal, amend, or revive
terms of other acts by referring to them only. The device
appeared early in the legislative history of the British colonies
in North America. 7 In the very first parliament of Upper
Canada," by the first act of its first session, the "laws of England"
as of that date were adopted to govern "property and civil
rights,"9 thus establishing a precedent later followed when each
of the four western Canadian provinces were carved from territory where the common law had not been introduced "by the
silent operation of constitutional principles." 10 Naturally, refer$Cf. similar definitions in Savage v. Wallace, (1910) 165 Ala. 572, 51
So. 605; Trimmier v. Carlton, (1927) 116 Tex. 572, 579, 296 S. W. 1070.
4See Carr, Legislation by Reference and Technique of Amendments,
(1940)
5

22 J. Comp. Leg. (3d ser.) 12.

See Statute of Westminster II, ch. 11 (1285), which adopted terms of
Statute of Marlborough, ch. 23 (1267).
6Anonymous Cases, (1310) Y.B. Hilary Term, 4 Edw. II, 3, 4. (26
Sel. Soc. 3).
7See account of adoption of the "Lawes of Virginia" in Minute of the
Order which provided for the first establishment of a court in the English
colony of Nova Scotia: (1920) 56 Can. L. J., 281, 282-283.
sSee
Clement, Law of the Canadian Constitution, (3d ed. 1916) 285.
9
By Upper Canada, Statutes 32 Geo. III, ch. 1, it was enacted that
"from and after the passing of this Act, in all matters of controversy relative to property and civil rights, resort should be had to the laws of
England as the rule for the decision of the same." As to criminal law, see
Upper Canada, Statutes 40 Geo. III, ch. 1.
1OE.g. Manitoba, Supplementary Provisions Act, 51 Vict. ch. 33, sec.
-4: Northwest Territories Act, 60-61 Vict. ch. 28, sec. 4, Canada, Rev. Stat.
1927, ch. 124, sec. 4; Canada, Rev. Stat. 1927, ch. 124, sec. 14; The Alberta
Act, Canada, Statutes 4-5 Edw. VII, ch. 3, sec. 16; The Saskatchewan
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ence legislation involving less epochal matters became a matter
of course.
State constitutions of the United States adopted the "suitable"
legal institutions and law of the pre-existing colonies, territories,
and states by reference,"1 and it was not an uncommon course of
legislation in the states, at an early date, to adopt the law of England by like method.12 It has been held that the general maritime law, with modifications adjusting it to conditions and needs
on this side of the Atlantic, was impliedly adopted as part
of the federal law of the United States by sec. 2, article III of
the constitution." Also in many instances Congress has incorporated or adopted into federal laws acts or parts of acts from the
session laws of the states1 4 and state legislatures have similarly
taken provisions from federal and sister states' laws. 5
A referential statute, accurately so-called, operates in either
of two ways: first, and most commonly, the new act adopts
precepts, in whole or in part, from other law; or second, the act
provides that it shall be incorporated into all acts df a certain
kind that may be passed in the future.'" Common examples of
Act, 4-5 Edw. VII, ch. 42, sec. 16, Canada, Statutes; The English Law
Ordinance, 1867, 30 Vict. No. 70, British Columbia, Rev. Stat. 1936, ch. 88;
Upper Canada, Statutes 32 Geo. III, ch. 1, Ontario, Rev. Stat. 1937, ch.
145. The law of England was brought into the Maritime Provinces "in the
knapsacks of the settlers," not by reference. See especially Uniacke v.
Dickson, (1848) 2 N. S. R. 287.
"Some references are express, others implied. See e.g. People v. Mayor
and Aldermen of New York, (1840) 25 Wend. (N.Y.) 9, 33; Cass v.
Dillon, (1853) 2 Ohio St. 607; Lorman v. Benson, (1860) 8 Mich. 18;
Coburn v. Harvey, (1864) 18 Wis. 156; State v. Bilansky, (1859) 3 Minn.
246 (Gil. 169). This last case has additional historical interest in holding that benefit of clergy was not part of the common law of the territory
of Wisconsin, and hence not adopted by the reference in sec. 12 of the
organic act of Minnesota.
"-E.g., Common and statute law of England was adopted by reference
in Florida in 1829 and 1832. See Mathis v. State, (1893) 31 Fla. 291, 306,
12 So. 681; Henderson v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1937) 18 F. Supp. 404,
406 (Statutes of 1920 provide that such laws down to 1776, with certain
exceptions, shall be in force). Georgia act of 1784 adopted the common
law of England, and Georgia code of 1863 also made parts of canon and
civil law in force in the state. South Carolina, Gen. Stat. 1882, sec. 2738
adopted the common law of England.
"3Panama R. R. v. Johnson, (1924) 264 U. S. 375, 385-386, 44 Sup.
Ct. 391,
68 L. Ed. 748.
' 4See Kendall v. United States, (1838) 12 Pet. (U.S.) 524, 625, 9
L. Ed. 1181; Robinson & Co. v. Belt, (1902) 187 U. S. 41, 48, 23 Sup.
Ct. 16, 47 L. Ed. 65.
'SSee Quinlan v. Houston and Tex. Cent. Ry., (1896) 89 Tex. 356,
371, 34 S. W. 738; Clements v. Hall, (1921) 23 Ariz. 2, 9, 201 Pac. 87.
See discussion
infra.
' 8 E.g. the so-called consolidation acts. For an early application of this
type, see Attorney General v. Great Eastern Ry., (1872) L. R. 7 Ch. 475,
41 L. J. Ch. 505 (Railway Clauses Consolidation Act). Wording that is
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the latter are the general interpretation acts.' 7
(As statutes
which use the former method are by far the more numerous
and troublesome, all discussion hereafter will concern them unless
Further, as to method, a
otherwise is expressly indicated).
effect
just described may either
with
the
adoptive
referential act
(a) apply to a new set of circumstances law originally passed for
the purpose of dealing with another set of circumstances, or, less
often, (b) apply to some matter a code originally passed for the
purpose of being applied from time to time in a certain sphere
as occasion requires.1" However, each of these modes as compared to the other has merely incidental peculiarities; and they
will be adverted to later.
A person who seeks the law within the covers of the statute
book must first of all discover whether the provision under his
immediate perusal is self-contained, and, if it is not, in what
direction and how far afield he must go to supply its deficiencies.
To do this he must interpret. If, despite textual interpretation,
he finds a hiatus in legislative expression, he will look for the
legislative intention as to how to fill that hiatus. Before resorting to some contextual aid such as, for example, application of
the in pari materia canon, he will investigate whether there is
an incorporation of terms by reference. If he finds an express
reference, his first step is easy; and for that reason a draftsman
should be careful to make an intended express reference clear.
A typical example of the result of a failure to do so was dealt
with by Chief Justice Coleridge in Mather v. Brown' 9 where he
20
held that a section of the Municipal Corporations Act, 1835,'
was neither extended to nor incorporated with the Municipal
Elections Act 1875, by the following reference:
"This Act shall, as far as consistent with the tenor thereof, be
construed as one with the Act 5 & 6 Will. 4, ch. 76 (Municipal
Corporations Act) and the acts amending the same. .. .1
characteristic of such acts appears in The Lands Clauses Consolidation
Act, 1845 (8 & 9 Vict. ch. 18) which provides by sec. 1 "that this Act
shall apply to every undertaking authorized by an Act which shall hereafter be passed, and which shall authorize the purchase or taking of lands
for such undertaking, and this Act shall be incorporated with such Act .. "
For a discussion of this act see In re Wood's Estate, (1886) 31 Ch. D.
607, 55 L. J.Ch. 488.
17See Canadian Uniform Interpretation Act, Part II, sec. 2.
18 See Graham-Harrison, Criticisms of the Statute Book, (1935) J.Soc.
Pub. Teach. Law 9, 26.
39(1876) 1 C. P. D. 596, 45 L. 3. Q. B. 547.
205-6 Win. IV, ch. 76.

2138-39 Vict. ch. 40, sec. 13. An example of a back-handed form of
words which was construed to have effected an incorporation by reference
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There may be an implied reference. Cases involving the
question of incorporation of terms by implication or necessary
intendment, although not plentiful, have usually been vexatious.
One of the most interesting arose recently in Wisconsin. In
Gilson Bros. Co. v.Worden-Allen Co.2 2 the question was whether
the plaintiff was a beneficiary of a contractor's bond and hence
could claim as a party in interest under an act of 193123 which
required such bonds to be secured in public works contracts.
The act provided that the bond should cover labor and
materials, but was silent concerning the extent of the class
of persons protected, and contained no words of express reference whatever. It was held that as the legislature did not
attempt to give anyone a mechanic's lien on a public building,
but instead devised the plan of placing a bond, to be given by
the principal contractor where it would serve to save from loss
persons who were so related to the work that they would have
been protected by the mechanic's lien act had they been dealing
with a contractor who was building for an individual, the 1931
act by necessary implication incorporated therein the classification of parties in interest contained in the mechanic's lien statute
ipsissimis verbis. The plaintiff did not fall within that classification.24
England supplies an example of a finding that an implied
incorporation by reference was effected despite what appeared
to be an express negation contained in the referring statute
itself. The Metropolitan Board of Works, by an act passed
in 1877,25 was authorized to acquire specified land for street improvement, and sec. 33 thereof provided the machinery and regulated the procedure by which such land was to be acquired and
sold or let. Later, by an amending act, passed in 1892,26 the board
is Kentucky, Acts 1936, ch. 105, p. 327: "Nothing contained herein or in
chapter one hundred forty-two (142)

of the Acts of one thousand nine

hundred thirty-two (1932) of the General Assembly of Kentucky, shall be

construed as affecting the duties of the county attorney, with reference to

the giving of notice as provided in section four thousand one hundred
fifty-three (4,153), Carroll's Kentucky Statutes, or as affecting his compensation as provided in said section." For a discussion thereof, see Miller
v. Kirksey, (1936) 265 Ky. 106, 110-111, 95 S.W. (2d) 1059.
22(1936) 220 Wis. 347, 265 N. W. 217.
23Wisconsin,
Laws 1931, Ch. 438; Wisconsin, Statutes, sec. 289.16.
2
See also Corry v. Mayor and Council of Baltimore, (1904) 196
U. S. 466, 477-478, 25 Sup. Ct. 297, 49 L. Ed. 556; Turney v. Wilton,
(1865) 36 Ill. 385, 393; Johnson v. Laffoon, (1934) 257 Ky. 156, 160-161,
77 S.2W. (2d) 345.
-5 kfetropolitan Street Improvements Act, (40-41 Vict. ch. 235).
2r45-46 Vict. ch. 222.
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was required to erect artisans' dwellings on three of the lots.
Section 3 of the amending act declared:
"From and after the passing of this Act the provisions contained in section 33 of the Act of 1877 shall cease to be in force
with respect to the lands shewn on the Gray's Inn Road plan,
[the land on which the dwellings were to be built] and authorized
to be taken by the Act of 1877, and in relation thereto the Act
of 1877 shall be read as though the said section were not contained
therein."
In Wigram v. Fryer2 7 Mr. Justice North held that because the
amending act had failed to provide the Board with the essential
machinery to enable it to erect the required dwellings, the provisions of sec. 33 of the principal act of 1877 were, despite the
language of sec. 3, referentially adopted pro tanto by necessary
implication. Well might the judge remark,
"It is a very lamentable way of legislating, that one should be
driven to get at the meaning of these Acts by removing difficulties (as far as can be done) by construction, rather than that
legislature should be clearly expressed upon
the intention of the 28
the face of the Act."

EXTENT AND EFFECT OF A REFERENCE

If the seeker of the law of the statute finds that there is a
reference, either express or implied, he next must solve the problem of its extent in the sense simply of quantity, that is how many
of the terms of the law to which reference is made does the referential act gain?
If the reference is express and specific, that is, one which
refers to one or more named provisions of another act or to one
or more named acts and applies it or them to the subject of
the adopting statute, he will have little trouble."5 But general
references are pregnant with litigation. In them the very looseness of the referring language is a command invitation to the
courts to partake in the legislative process-and they have responded with a rule of reason: "In the construction of general
27(1887) 36 Ch. D. 87, 56 L. J. Ch. 1098.
2sVigram v. Fryer, (1887) 36 Ch. D. 87, 99, 56 L. J.Ch. 1098.
2
9See Kendall v. United States, (1838) 12 Pet. (U.S.) 524, 625, 9
L. Ed. 1181; Interstate Consol. St. Ry. v. Massachusetts, (1907) 207
U. S. 79, 84-85, 28 Sup. Ct. 26, 52 L. Ed. 111; Panama R. R. v. Johnson,
(1924) 264 U. S.375, 391-392, 44 Sup. Ct. 391, 68 L. Ed. 748; Garland v.
Hickey, (1889) 75 Wis. 178, 182-183, 43 N. W. 832. Interpretation acts
sometimes assist in making specific references additionally precise, e.g.
Alberta. Rev. Stat. 1922, ch. 1, sees. 33, 34; Manitoba, Rev. Stat. 1913,
ch. 105, sec. 26.
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references in acts of Parliament, such reference must be made
only as will stand with reason and right." 30
A typical general reference is illustrated and the judicial modus
operandi in applying this standard is neatly revealed by an Alabama case.3 1 There the question was whether the clerk of the city
court of Mobile had power to issue an original attachment. By
statute there had been conferred upon that court "all the powers,
[with one exception not here relevant], of the several circuit
courts of the state." 32 The clerks of those courts had been, by a
previous statute, expressly empowered to issue an original attachment. The court called reason to their aid as follows:
"An original attachment is not an ordinary process, and does
not issue out of a court, and does not pertain to the exercise of
the ordinary powers and jurisdiction of a court. It is an extraordinary process, and can only be issued by the persons or officers
upon whom the statute confers special authority to issue it. The
power exercised in issuing it is in its nature judicial33 . . . and is

not such as pertains to the clerk of a court merely as a clerk, and
such as he exercises in the issue of process which issues out of the
34
court and pertains to the exercise of the jurisdiction of the court."
The conclusion was that the reference clause conferred upon the
clerk of the city court, a ministerial officer, the general powers of
the clerks of the circuit courts, but not the power to issue an
original attachment, a power special and in its nature judicial.2 5
Perhaps it is not out of place to observe just here that tasks
30
Lord Denman C. J. in The Queen v. Badcock, (1845) 6 Q. B. 787,
797, citing 2 Inst. 287. In Jones v. Dexter, (1859) 8 Fla. 276, 285, the
same doctrine is expressed in varied language: ".

.

. where the provisions

of a statute are adopted by general reference it will receive a more liberal
construction than if originally passed with reference to the particular subject." See also Panama R. R. v. Johnson, (1924) 264 U. S. 375, 391-392,

44 Sup. Ct. 391, 68 L. Ed. 748; Hutto v. Walker County, (1913) 185 Ala.
505, 31
64 So. 313.
Matthews, Finley & Co. v. Sands & Co., (1856) 29 Ala. 136. See
also 32
Stevenson v. O'Hara, (1855) 27 Ala. 362.
Alabama, Acts 1851-2, No. 66.
a3Citing United States v. Ferriera, (1851) 13 How. (U.S.) 40, 14
L. Ed.
34 42.
Matthews, Finley & Co. v. Sands & Co., (1856) 29 Ala. 136, 138.
Italics by the writer.
3
5For similar effect see The King v. Justices of Surry, (1788) 2 Durn.
& E. 504. See Du Pont v. Mills, (Del. 1937) 196 Atl. 168 holding that "in
the same manner as other elections" referred only to procedure and not to
qualifications of voters; and Adams v. State, (Neb. 1940) 294 N. W. 396,
holding that the general reference in: "If any bailee of any money, bank bill
br note, goods or chattels shall convert the same to his or her own use
with an intent to steal the same, he shall be deemed guilty of larceny in
the same manner as if the original taking had been felonious; and on conviction thereof shall be punished accordingly," incorporated only the penalty
provisions of the larceny statute.
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of this kind thrust upon the courts by using general references
do not appear to be materially lightened by the clause sometimes
inserted to the effect that the adopted law "shall apply save so far
as expressly varied or excepted" by the referring act."' 3 Neither
are they lightened by a direction that the law referred to shall be
applied "only in so far as the same are applicable," since after all
that is but an express mandate to employ the rule of reason.'Employment of this direction has, indeed, been held to authorize
judicial legislation to the degree necessary to save a referential
act from being so uncertain as to be an insufficient expression of
the legislative will.3 8
Sometimes the identity of the provisions included within a
general reference is impossible to discover. Then, the extent of
the reference being wholly indeterminable, the referring act is
void for uncertainty; there is a casus omissus. This obviously
occurs and is easily established when no law of the sort named
in the reference exists.3 9 Also it happens when a statute provides that its subject shall be governed by the law concerning
some other subject, and that law is unidentifiable, as in the
New Mexican case where the reference was to "the laws of
this state as to method and manner of appropriation and use
of underground waters" and different laws containing contradictory rules were applicable to underground waters according
to whether or not they were artesian.40
Extent of a reference in time, that is in respect of adoption
36See Minnesota, Laws, 1939, ch. 369, sec. 2.
37See Minnesota, Laws, 1939, ch. 12, sec. 23.
3
8E.g. see Panama R. R. v. Johnson, (1924) 264 U. S. 375, 389, 44
Sup. Ct. 391, 68 L. Ed. 748, holding that rules of the Federal Employers
Liability Act were incorporated into the maritime laws, 38 Stat. at L. 1185,
ch. 153, sec. 20, as amended by sec. 33 of Act of June 5, 1920, 41 Stat, at
L. 1007, ch. 250, which provided that ". . . all statutes of the United States
modifying or extending the common law right or remedy in cases of personal injuries to railway employees shall apply." See also AttorneyGeneral v. Great Eastern Ry., (1872) 7 Ch. D. 475, 41 L. J. Ch. 505;
State ex rel. Bancroft v. Frear, (1910) 144 Wis. 79, 128 N. W. 1068;
Gillesby v. Board of County Commissioners, (1910) 17 Idaho 586, 107
Pac. 71.
39See Savage v. Wallace, (1910) 165 Ala. 572, 51 So. 605. In Scottish
Union & National Ins. Co. v. Phoenix Title & Trust Co., (1925) 28 Ariz.
22, 235 Pac. 137 where statute of Arizona adopted by reference the "New
York standard" insurance policy without further identification. It was held
that since the court could take judicial notice of what that form was the
reference was not void for want of certainty.
4
oYeo v. Tweedy, (1929) 34 N. M. 611, 286 Pac. 970. See also Rutledge v. City of Greenville, (1930) 155 S. C. 520, 152 S. E. 700. Cf. State
ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, (1939) 205 Minn.
545, 556, 287 N. W. 297.
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of change in the adopted measure made subsequent to the
reference, methodically should be considered here. Historically,
however, the pertinent law had its beginning as a logical inference from the rule governing the primary effect of a reference
upon the status of an adopted precept. It is desirable, therefore,
to consider that law in its setting as a secondary result of that
primary effect.
The courts are unanimous concerning the primary legal effect
of a statutory reference. Whenever an act of the legislature
brings into itself by reference pre-existing common law precepts
or the terms of another act, the precepts and terms to which reference is made are to be considered and treated as if they were
incorporated into and made a part of the referring act just as
41
completely as though they had been explicitly written therein.
The adopted provisions as such derive their vitality solely from the
42

referential statute.

From this primary doctrine flow certain secondary results.
The first is that a two step process is introduced to the interpretation and construction of the adopted language. It must
first be read in the sense which it bore in the original act from
which it was taken, 43 and next in the light of its new environ41
The Queen v. Merionethshire, (1844) 6 Q. B. 343; In re Wood's
Estate, (1886) 31 Ch. D. 607, 55 L. J. Ch. 488; McKenzie v. Jackson,
(1898) 31 N.S.R. 70; Kilgour v. London St. Ry., (1914) 30 0. L. R.
603, 19 D. L. R. 827; Waterside Workers' Fed. of Australia v. J. W.
Alexander, Ltd., (1918) 25 C. L. R. 434, 471; Cathcart v. Robinson,
(1831) 5 Pet. (U.S.) 264, 279, 8 L. Ed. 120; Engel v. Davenport, (1926)
271 U. S.33, 38, 46 Sup. Ct. 410, 70 L. Ed. 813; Turney v. Wilton, (1865)
36 I1. 385; Jones v. Chamberlain, (1888) 109 N. Y. 100, 16 N. E. 72;
Don v. Pfister, (1916) 172 Cal. 25, 155 Pac. 60; Richardson v. Kildow,
(1928) 116 Neb. 648, 218 N. W. 429.
4
2"The source from which the new rules are drawn contributes nothing
to their force in the field to which they are translated. In that field their
strength and operation come altogether from their inclusion in the [newl
. ..law."-Panama R. R. Co. v. Johnson, (1923) 264 U. S.375, 389, 44
Sup. Ct. 391, 68 L. Ed. 748, citing Louisville & Nashville R. v. Western
Union Tel. Co., (1915) 237 U. S. 300, 303, 35 Sup. Ct. 598, 59 L. Ed.
965. See also Gadd v. McGuire, (1924) 69 Cal. App. 347, 369, 231 Pac.
754; Crohn v. Kansas City Home Tel. Co., (1908) 131 Mo. App. 313, 109
S. W. 1068.
43 Pennock v. Dialogue, (1829) 2 Pet. (U.S.) 1, 18, 7 L. Ed. 327;
Commonwealth v. Hartnett, (1855) 3 Gray (Mass.) 450; Tyler v. Tyler,
(1857) 19 Ill. 151; Giguere v. E. B. and A. C. Whiting Co., (1935) 107
Vt. 151, 177 AtI. 313; Medow v. Riggert, (1937) 132 Neb. 429, 272 N. W.
238; Huffman v. Buckingham Transp. Co. of Colorado, (C.C.A. 10th Cir.
1938) 98 F. (2d) 916; Carr's Inc. v. Industrial Commission, (Wis. 1940)
292 N. W. 1. Cf. dictum in United States ex rel. Demarois v. Farrell,
(C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1937) 87 F. (2d) 957, 962, that "Even if it [federal probation law] were copied from a state statute, it does not follow that the
construction placed upon the state statute by the highest court of the state
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ment, textual and otherwise. 44
The second of these secondary results has concerned the
effect of modifications of the adopted law, made subsequent to
the adoption, upon the referential statute, that is to say, the
extent of a reference in time. Here a study of the cases in
which the now established rules were evolved reveals in striking
fashion the genius of the courts for compromising between the
dictates of logic and practical expediency. The earlier decisions
in both England and the United States hold without qualification that the repeal of the incorporated law leaves the referring
one in force, unless it also is repealed expressly or by necessary
implication, and that the reference does not carry with it changes
afterwards made in the former. Taking as premise the primary
effect of a reference, the logic of such a rule is obviously unassailable. 45 Moreover, as Mr. Justice Thompson pointed out
in Kendall v. United States, ".

.

. no other rule would furnish

any certainty as to what was the law, and would be adopting
prospectively all changes that might be made in the law." 4 This
47
is apparently still the unqualified common law rule in England
is under all circumstances binding upon the federal courts, however persuasive such decisions may be."
In Mayor of Portsmouth v. Smith, (1885) 10 App. Cas. 364, 371, 54
L. J. Q. B. 473, Lord Blackburn said: "Where a single section of an act
of parliament is introduced into another act, I think it must be read in the

sense which it bore in the original act from which it was taken, and that

consequently it is perfectly legitimate to refer to all the rest of that act
in order to ascertain what the section meant, though those other sections
are not incorporated in the new Act.' See also Attorney-General v. Smyth
& Fenton, [1905] 2 Ir. R. 553. judicial interpretations not made prior to
adoption, and legislative interpretations made before adoption, when the
reference is to the laws of another legislature, will be disregarded. Deugau
v. Kramer,
[1938] 4 D. L. R. 353, [1938] 3 W. W. R. 269.
44
United States ex rel. Demarois v. Farrell, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1937) 87
F. (2d) 957, 962-963; Gadd v. McGuire, (1924) 69 Cal. App. 347, 369, 231
Pac. 754; Penn. Bridge Co. v. City of New Orleans, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1915)

222 Fed. 737, 741.

Cf. where a special act incorporates and is expressly

directed to be construed together with a public general act,-West Ham
Corpn.
v. Grant, (1888) 40 Ch. D. 331, 58 L. J. Ch. 121.
45
See In the Matter of Main Street, (1885) 98 N. Y. 454, 456-457;
Court of Insolvency v. Meldon, (1897) 69 Vt. 510, 38 Atl. 167.
46(1838) 12 Pet. (U.S.) 524, 625, 9 L. Ed. 1181. See also Griswold v.
Atlantic Dock Co., (1855) 21 Barb. (N.Y.) 225, 228.
4T(a) The Queen v. Stock, (1838) 8 Ad. & El. 405; The Queen v.
Smith, (1873) L. R. 8 Q. B. 146, 42 L. J. M. C. 46; Aereated Bread Co. v.
Gregg, (1873) L. R. 8 Q. B. 355, 42 L. J. M. C. 117; Jenkins v. Great
Central Ry., [1912] 1 K. B. 1, 81 L. J. K. B. 24. In Secretary of State for
India v. Hindustan Cooperative Ins. Soc., (1931) 58 I. A. 259, 267, Sir
George Lowndes, speaking for the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council,
said, after stating the rule as to repeal of an adopted statute: "It seems to
be no less logical to hold that where certain provisions from an existing act
have been incorporated into a subsequent act, no addition to the former
act, which is not expressly made applicable to the subsequent act, can be
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Ontario,48 and Nova Scotia.49
But, despite their initial declaration of firm loyalty to a
rule coined of logic and dedicated to certainty, it was not long
before the "American" courts, while in the throes of construction, resorted to the "Intention of the Legislature," that
Aladdin's lamp which has so often enabled Anglo-American
courts to conjure much from little or nothing. The result was
a distinction between two types of reference: Where one statute
adopts the whole or a part of another statute"0 by a particular or
descriptive 5 ' reference to the statute or provisions adopted, such
deemed to be incorporated in it, at all events if it is possible for the subsequent act to function effectually without the addition."
(b) The common law rule stated in the text supra was modified
in England by the Interpretation Act, 1889, 52-53 Vict. ch. 63 sec. 38 (1),
which reads: "Where this act or any act passed after the commencement of
this act repeals and re-enacts, with or without modification, any provisions
of a former act, references in any other act to the provisions so repealed,
shall, unless the contrary intention appears, be construed as reference to the
provisions so re-enacted." See 31 Halsbury, Laws of England (2d ed. 1938)
565, n. (q), for cases applying this provision. See also interpretation acts,
Canada, Rev. Stat. 1927 ch. 1, sec. 20(b);- Alberta, Rev. Stat. 1922, ch. 2,
sec. 15; British Columbia, Rev. Stat. 1936, ch. 1, sec. 17; Manitoba, Rev.
Stat. 1913, ch. 105, sec. 34; New Brunswick, Rev. Stat. 1927, ch. 1, sec. 27;
Nova Scotia, Rev. Stat. 1923, ch. 1, sec. 9; Ontario, Rev. Stat. 1937, ch. 1,
sec. 16(b) ; Saskatchewan, Rev. Stat. 1930, ch. 1, sec. 41; Australia, Commonwealth Acts 1901-1935, Acts of Interpretation Act 1901-1932, sec. 10.
In 1916 Australia added: "Where in any act reference is made to any
other act, and that other act is subsequently amended, then unless the contrary intention appears the reference shall, from the date of the amendment,
be deemed to be to that Act as so amended." Now Acts of Interpretation
Act 1901-1935, sec. 10A.
48Kilgour v. London St. Ry., (1914) 30 0. L. R. 603, 19 D. L. R. 827.
(See this case also for effect given to a statutory reversal of a common
law rule.)
4McKenzie v. Jackson, (1898) 31 N. S. R. 70.
rOReferential provisions where the reference is made to another part of
the same act stand on a different footing and involve peculiar problems.
See Thring, Practical Legislation (1902) 48-52; Report of the Committee
on Legislative Drafting (1919) Conference of Commission on Uniform
Laws 5. Consult interpretation acts, e.g. Alberta, Rev. Stat. 1922, ch. 1, sees.
32, 33; British Columbia, Rev. Stat. 1936, ch. 1, sees. 52, 53. See Crohn v.
Kansas City Home Tel. Co., (1908) 131 Mo. App. 313, 109 S.W. 1068.
51A "descriptive" reference is sometimes difficult to distinguish from
a "general" one, as will be shown in discussion in the text infra. Typical
descriptive references are: "Company within the meaning of the Companies Acts," "Any alien . . . convicted of an offence under . . . this act,

shall ... be kept in custody and deported in accordance with the provisions
of the Immigration Act relating to enquiry, detention and deportation.
(Opium and Narcotic Drugs Act. Canada, Rev. Stat. 1927, ch. 144, sec.
24.) See the reference considered in Damron v. Rankin, (Tex. Civ. App.
1931) 34 S. W. (2d) 360. In Hutto v. Walker County, (1913) 185 Ala.
505, 508, 64 So. 313, the reference was as follows: "All provisions of the
election law pertaining to the contest of an election of constable shall be
observed as to the contest hereunder.

. .. "

On p. 509 the court said that

incorporation by reference "does not require the specific adoption of the
existing statutes suis nominibus," and held that this was a descriptive refer-
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adoption takes the statute as it exists at the time of adoption and
does not include subsequent additions, modifications, or repeals
of the statute so taken unless it does so expressly or by necessary
implication. 2 But where the reference is, not to any particular
statute or part of a statute, but to the law generally which governs
a specified subject, the reference will be regarded as including, not
only the law on that subject in force at the date of the referential
act, but also that law as it exists from time to time thereafter. 3
The distinction just stated appears to have been drawn first
in a Florida case, Jones v. Dexter, in 1859."4 An act of 1828
adopted in general terms as the rule for the distribution of personalty on intestacy "the provisions of the law regulating descents."
At that time descents of realty were covered by an act of 1822,
but in 1829 it was superseded. The 1829 act was substantially
borrowed from Kentucky, which in turn had derived it from
Virginia. Both states had enacted it after a referential act had
applied the law of descents to personalty, and in both the reference
had been held not to extend. to it. On perusing the Virginia and
Kentucky decisions," the Florida court found a distinction between the wording of the reference clauses pronounced upon
therein and that of the one before it. Said the court:
"In the construction of our statute of 1828, we are wholly relieved from the pressure which bore upon the Virginia and Kentucky courts, growing out of the particular phraseology of their
adopting acts. Our statute makes no reference to any particular
act, by its title or otherwise, but uses the broader and more comence which, like a specific or particular one, adopted the described law as it
existed at the time of adoption only, and thus did not include a later amendment.
52Culver v. People, (1896) 161 Ill. 89, 43 N. E. 812; Nampa & Meridian Irrigation Dist. v. Barker, (1924) 38 Idaho 529, 223 Pac. 529; People v.
Whipple, (1874) 47 Cal. 592; Ventura County v. Clay, (1896) 112 Cal. 65,
44 Pac. 488; State v. Caseday, (1911) 58 Or. 429, 115 Pac. 287; Gilson
Brothers Co. v. Worden-Allen Co., (1936) 220 Wis. 347, 265 N. W. 217;
Devery v. Vebb, (1937) 58 Idaho 118, 70 P. (2d) 377; Noble v. Noble,
(Or. 1940) 103 P. (2d) 293, 298.
53I.e. at the time each exigency arises to which the law is required to be
applied. See rules stated in Knapp v. City of Brooklyn, (1884) 97 N. Y. 520;
Culver v. People, (1896) 161 Ill. 89, 43 N. E. 812; Hutto v. Walker County,
(1913) 185 Ala. 505, 64 So. 313; Johnson v. Laffoon, (1934) 257 Ky. 156,
77 S.W. (2d) 345; Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Southern Ry., (N.D. N.C.
1898) 89 Fed. 190. There is no distinction between references to substantive
and procedural precepts in this respect. See Guenthoer's Estate, (1912) 235
Pa. St. 67, 74, 83 AtI. 617.
'4(1859) 8 Fla. 276.
55Tomlinson v. Dilliard, (1801) 3 Call (Va.) 105; Dilliard v. Tomlin-

son, (1810) 1 Munf. (Va.) 183; Pinkard v. Smith, (1821) Litt. Sel. Cas.

(Ky.) 331. The reference in each of the acts considered in these cases was
to the adopted act by its exact title.
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prehensive term 'law"'-the law governing descents.' The term
'law' is more general than the term 'act', and is of much more ex.
tensive signification, and especially so in its application when the
latter is limited and qualified by the designation of its title .... It

would be monstrous indeed to hold, that because the provisions of
a statute, expecially enacted with reference to a particular subject,
had been, by mere adoption in general terns, applied to a subject
of an essentially different nature, those provisions still continued
in force in relation to that other subject, notwithstanding the
original act should have been expressly repealed. The bare announcement of the proposition furnishes its own condemnation. It
is illogical and wholly incompatible with any idea of sound reason.
We are not unaware that there are instances where a repeal of the
original act operates no further than to affect the original subject
... ;but this is not of that class of cases.""
It followed that the act of 1829 furnished the rule of descent for
personalty.
By such logic was a distinction born, a logic sound enough
on its immediate premises but hardly compatible with the primary
legal effect of a reference. Certainly it is well worth quoting at
length, for two reasons: first, because many courts outside of
Florida were quick to crystallize this distinction, (expedient though
it was merely to construing a relatively obscure statute of that
state), into a dogmatic rule; and second, because reasoned judicial
applications of the distinction have been rarer than radium. Indeed, practically every judge who has since made use of it "seems
to have shrunk from the discussion thereof, and reposed himself
upon the sanctity of former decisions.

15

T

In stating the rule which originated in Jones v. Dexter the
present writer in the text just before stating the case has used
the language and its arrangement most common to judicial
opinions and text books. From that language the essential distinction involved might well appear to be between whether or
not the adopted precept was statutory or common law. But
the distinction plainly does not lie there; it actually operates
only when the precept to which reference is made happens to
be in legislative form. When the precept is a part of the unwritten
5d6Jones v. Dexter, (1859) 8 Fla. 276, 282-283. Italics by the court.
57A likely explanation is that the doubtful origin of the rule has been
outweighed by its convenience as a device for reaching desired results. In
La Cite de Montreal v. Poulin, (1904) 25 Q. L. R. (S.C.) 364, this rule was
advanced by counsel in argument, citing United States authority, but the
court held that it had been displaced by a declaratory statute applicable to
the case before the court, which statute had expressly said that amendments to the specifically adopted act made after its adoption were to be
included in the referring one.
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law, a reference to it for adoptive purposes is always general.
But when it is statutory, the reference may be either specific or
general, depending upon the form of words used as construed
in the light of the precept to which the reference is made.
Especially difficult to construe in this regard in advance of
litigation are descriptive references. How determine in a given
case between description and generality? Thus in Chelan County
v. Navarre's the reference in question was contained in a general
statute relating to condemnation proceedings. It provided that
"In case a jury is waived, as in civil cases in- courts of record,
in the manner prescribed by law, the compensation to be paid
for the property sought to be appropriated shall be ascertained
and determined by the court or the judge thereof, and the proceedings shall be the same as in trials of an issue of fact by the
court."
When this reference was made in 1891 waiver of juries in ordinary civil actions was governed by a single general statute which
allowed no constructive waiver, but it was amended in 1903 to
provide for that species of waiver. In holding that the 1903 act
enabled a constructive waiver to be found in condemnation proceedings begun in 1904, the court said:
"Here the adopting statute does not refer to any particular act,
but to the general statute on the subject of waiving a jury trial,
hence the existing law governs the subject, and not the law in
force at the time the condemnation statute was enacted." 59
The character of this reference appears to be plain. But compare
People v. Crossley,0 where it was held that the following reference in an act to authorize the organization of high school districts
was to a specific statute, and not to the law generally on the particular subject, schools:
"For the purpose of supporting a high school, the township
or territory for the benefit of which a high school is established
under the provisions of this act, shall be regarded as a school district, and the board of education thereof shall, in all respects, have
the powers and discharge the duties of boards of education elected
under the general school law."
Here, just as in Chelan County v. Navarre, when the reference
was made the law adopted was contained in a general statute, but
58(1905) 38 Wash. 684, 80 Pac. 845, construing Washington, Codes
and Stats., Ballinger 1897, sec. 5620. See also Corkery v. Hinkle, (1923)
125 Wash. 671, 217 Pac. 47; Greene v. Town of Lakeport, (1925) 74 Cal.
App. 1, 239 Pac. 702.
59(1905) 38 Wash. 684, 688, 80 Pac. 845.
60(1913) 261 Ill. 78, 84, 103 N. E. 537, applying Illinois, Laws 1911, p.
505, sec. 5 as quoted in text. Italics by the writer.
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it happened here that the title of that general statute was "General
School Law," a phrase that coincided exactly with the wording of
the reference. If the draftsman of that reference thought about
the matter, the odds should probably be even that he intended it
to be general rather than specific, and would likely have been surprised to learn that he had opened the way for the court to decide
the question to accord with a restrictive rather than an expansive mood. Somewhat difficult to reconcile with this would be a
case holding that a reference to an act by its popular name is
general. 6'
Similarly it is somewhat difficult to find guidance by which
to draw the line between a general and specific reference in the
frequently cited, but apparently rarely read, Michigan case, Darmstaetter v. Moloney.6 There the following reference was held to
adopt "under general words of reference a specific regulation in a
OlBrabner-Smith, Incorporation by Reference and Delegation of Power
-Validity of "Reference" Legislation, (1937) 5 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 198, 204,
implies that a court might so hold.

The Interpretation Act, Manitoba, Rev. Stat. 1913, ch. 105, sec. 25, which
is designed to assist in making descriptive references specific, reads: "Where,
in any act, reference is made to an act by any name or designation other

than that of the chapter and year of enactment, it shall be understood that
the reference is intended to be to the act which by its terms, or the terms of
some other act, is to be or may be cited by that name or designation, or,

if there be none, to the act bearing such name or designation at the head or
beginning thereof, and, where there is more than one such act, then to that
one thereof in the Revised Statutes, 1913, unless the reference be in an act

later than the Revised Statutes 1913, and there be a later act than the corressponding one in the Revised Statutes 1913, which, it is provided as aforesaid,
may be cited by, or which bears a name or designation the same as, that so
mentioned, in which case or in case there is no such Act in the Revised
Statutes 1913, the reference shall be deemed to the latest act of the Legislature of Manitoba which it is provided, as aforesaid, may be so cited, or which
bears as aforesaid such name or designation, or if there be no such act of
such legislature, then to the latest act of the Parliament of Canada which
it is so provided, as aforesaid, may be so cited, or which so bears, as aforesaid, such name or designation." (Obviously a good idea, this provision
should have been re-drafted with clarity of expression in mind. But in 1939
the Manitoba Interpretation Act was revised, following substantially the
draft bill prepared by the Canadian Conf. of Commrs. on Uniformity of Leg.,
Manitoba, Statutes 1939, ch. 34, now Manitoba Rev. Stat. 1940, ch. 108; and
for the old sec. 25 was substituted sec. 21(1) of the new act: "In any act,
regulation or document, an act of the province or of Canada may be cited
by reference to its title or its short title, if any, either with or without
reference to the chapter of the Revised Statutes or of the statutes for the
year of Our Lord or of the regnal year in which the act was passed." In
a recent letter to the author the legislative counsel of Manitoba says:
"Section 25 has been partially reproduced in section 21.... In view of your
comments on old section 25 I am not entirely satisfied that our present act
is quite complete.")
02(1881) 45 Mich. 621, Cf. Guenthoer's Estate, (1912) 235 Pa. St. 67,
83 Atl. 617.
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separate general law" and hence not to include a later amendment
to the law so adopted:
"The assessor and aldermen . of the respective wards of the
city of Detroit, shall be and are hereby vested with the powers and
duties of supervisors, as provided by the laws of this state. . ...
"61
How can this be justified without stressing unduly the word "laws"
as compared with "law," an emphasis nowhere expressly indicated in the court's opinion ?64
Perhaps the apparent contradictions between the cases which
purport to apply the so-called rule of Jones v. Dexter are reconcilable on the basis of a silent application of an all pervading doctrine
of statutory construction: that a court may transmute any so-called
rule of construction into a mere canon to be discarded in the face
of the court's notion of what was or should have been the instant
"legislative intent." The Jones v. Dexter rule has been expressly
eliminated in that fashion on several occasions.65
Obviously the wise draftsman will avoid the rule of Jones v.
Dexter by explicitly stating whether or not a reference is confined to the then existing precept or is to include any future change
or substitution. Thus in a general reference an Illinois act provides that park taxes shall be collected "in such manner as is now
or may hereafter be provided by law for the collection of state and
county taxes." To a specific reference may be added "as the same
may be amended from time to time." 60
63
Michigan, Acts 1857, No. 55, ch, 9, sec. 3. Italics by the writer.
64For another example of such construction, see Hutto v. Walker
County, (1913) 185 Ala. 505, 64 So. 313. Such construction would make
specific, for example, the following reference in 2 Mason's Minn. Stat. 1927,
sec. 3463: "Any association may also invest its funds . . . in any securities
permitted by the laws of this state for the investment of the assets of life
insurance companies."
For an ingenious use of a descriptive reference by the court to fix the
time at which a referring act became law, see Ross v. Chambers, (1938)
214 Ind. 223, 14 N. E. (2d) 1012.
65E.g., In the Matter of Estate of Fratheim, (1923) 156 Minn. 366,
369, 194 N. W. 766.
66The Illinois law is the act of May 2, 1873 for improvement of parks
and boulevards (Illinois, Rev. Stat. 1874, p. 744) sec. 2. Cf. construction in
Culver v. People, (1896) 161 Ill. 89, 43 N. E. 812. See also Oklahoma,
Stat. 1921 sec. 6123, as applied in Dabney v. Hooker, (1926) 121 Okla. 193,
249 Pac. 380. The care that should be taken in drafting these provisions is
illustrated by a decision that references adopting expressly "existing general
law" and the "general law now in force" on a subject meant the law in force
when the referring act was later applied and not the law in force at the
time that act was passed. As the rule that a statute is to be taken as always
speaking rendered the above quoted phrases ambiguous, the court resorted to
contextual interpretation. Newman v. City of North Yakima, (1893) 7
Wash. 220, 34 Pac. 921. See also Guenthoer's Estate, (1912) 235 Pa. St.
67, 83 Atl. 617. But cf. Schlaudecker v. Marshall, (1872) 72 Pa. St. 200,

where "power . . . now has" was held to mean at the time the referring
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T
EVILS AND A \ IRTUE.

HEREIN OF STATE PROHIBITIONS

The apparent simplicity and labor saving value of this method
of legislating led naturally to its widespread adoption, and in the
days before legislation became the growing point of the law its
use gave rise to little difficulty. But as statutes became more
numerous and complex and the tempo of the legislative process
accelerated, evils soon developed. The description of the first of
them fifty years ago by Mr. Justice Mathew in Knill v. Towse
has with passage of time gained in point:
"Sometimes whole Acts of Parliament, sometimes groups of
clauses of Acts of Parliament, entirely or partially, sometimes
portions of clauses are incorporated into later Acts, so that the
interpreter has to keep under his eye, or, if he can, bear in his
mind, large masses of bygone and not always consistent legislation in order to gather the meaning of recent legislation. There
is very often the further provision that these earlier statutes
are incorporated only so far as they are not inconsistent with
the statute into which they are incorporated; so that you have
first to ascertain the meaning of a statute by reference to other
statutes, and then to ascertain whether the earlier Acts qualify
only or absolutely contradict the later ones, a task sometimes
of great difficulty, always of great labour-a difficulty and labour
generally speaking wholly unnecessary."6 7
The second evil was the unfair advantage which use of the
device enabled unscrupulous legislators to take of their fellows
and the public.
"This practice afforded a means of imposing upon unwary
members of the legislative bodies, and of procuring the passage
of amendments which would6 snever have been passed had their
effect been fully understood.

Third, apart altogether from the opportunity for fraud, the unfortunate result was inevitably to multiply the instances in which
legislation was enacted improvidently, "without that intelligent
consideration and understanding of the matter involved which is
so essential to the procurement of wise and wholesome legislation."6"
act was passed. Examples of provisions ambiguous in this respect are:
(a) Minnesota, Laws 1939, ch. 99, sec. 11, "The superintendent of schools
shall receive . . . such fees as are now prescribed by law ;" and Minnesota,
Laws 1939 ch. 114, sec. 4 ". . shall be taxed in accordance with existing
laws." Do not neglect Interpretation Act-see supra note 47b.
37(1889) 24 Q. B. D. 186, 195-196. To same effect see State v. Beddo,
(1900) 22 Utah 432, 434-435, 63 Pac. 96. For a recent criticism on similar
ground, see Legislation by Reference, (1932) Scots L. T. 1.
GsGaines C. J., Quinlan v. Houston & Tex. Cent. Ry., (1896) 89 Tex.
356, 34 S. W. 738, 740.
4-qStewart J., Manchester Township Supervisors v. Wayne County Commissioners, (1917) 257 Pa. St. 442, 448, 101 At. 736. See also Bay ShellRoad Co. v. O'Donnell, (1888) 87 Ala. 376, 6 So. 119.
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In an attempt to curb these evils 70 thirty-three of the United
States have adopted prohibitory constitutional provisions. They
are of three types. The first type, in force in twenty-one states,71
says that "no act shall be revised, revived or amended, by reference to its title only." Probably by a very liberal construction,
in the light of all three evils which they were intended to cure,
these constitutional provisions could have been held to prohibit
referential legislation altogether. But the courts realized that to
construe them so broadly would be both impractical and unreasonable, for, they said, if you will turn through a copy of the session
laws for any session, you will find much original legislation which
is complete in itself but refers to other statutes to define the scope
of its application; and to hold this legislation unconstitutional
would result in chaos.
"To require legislation to be so complete that no reference
would be necessary to any other legislation to determine the
meaning of the particular legislation would2 . . . hamper legislation almost to the extent of prohibiting it.'

As a consequence, by placing emphasis upon correction of the two
evils of referential legislation referred to last above, as being the
purpose of the constitutional prohibitions, and by also construing
in the light of relative results, most courts have held them to forbid enacting only statutes which are either incomplete in them70 Cooley J., Mok v. Detroit Bldg. and Say. Ass'n, (1875) 30 Mich. 511,
515-516.
71They vary in form, but all are to same effect. They include: Arizona,
constitution, art. IV, sec. 14; California, constitution, art. IV, sec. 24;
Florida, constitution, art. III, sec. 16; Georgia, constitution, art. III, sec. 7
(17) ; Idaho, constitution, art. III, sec. 18; Illinois, constitution, art. III,
sec. 13; Indiana, constitution, art. IV, sec. 21; Kansas, constitution, art.
III, sec. 16; Louisiana, constitution, art. 32; Maryland, constitution, art. 3,
sec. 29; Michigan, constitution, art. V, sec. 21; Mississippi, constitution,
art. IV, sec. 61; Missouri, constitution, art. IV, sec. 33; Nebraska, constitution, art. III, sec. 11; Nevada, constitution, art. IV, sec. 17; Ohio, constitution, art. II, sec. 16; Oregon, constitution, art. IV, sec. 22; Texas, constitution, art. III, sec. 36; Virginia, constitution, art. III, sec. 52; Washington, constitution, art. II, sec. 37; West Virginia, constitution, art. VI, sec.
30. (Not included is Tennessee, constitution, art. II, sec. 17, which merely
requires recital of "the title or substance of the law" referred to.
72See dissenting opinion, Farris v. Wright, (1923) 158 Ark. 519, 524525, 250 S. W. 889. This case is a good illustration of the line of demarcation between an amendment by reference, which offends the first and second
types of constitutional provision, and an inclusion of terms by reference,
which does not. The following enactment was upheld because it did not
merely confer a new remedy or method of procedure for enforcing a preexisting substantive right, i.e. was not amendatory, but itself created a new
substantive right, i.e. was original and referential: "The estate of curtesy is
hereby abolished, and hereafter, upon the death of a married woman, her
surviving husband shall have in her estate the same interest that the wife
has in the estate of the husband upon his death under the laws of this state."
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selves or which by reference expressly revise, amend, extend, or
revive prior acts, and not to forbid incorporation in an independent
new act the terms of an old one.73
This position is not difficult to defend, since, although they too
are susceptible to being used for evil purposes and to cloak a
draftsman's laziness or ignorance or both, incorporating references have certain compensating virtues to be later mentioned
which may justify their use; virtues which in case of amendments
and repeals by reference have less redemptive value.
Ten states have provisions of a second type as follows: "No
law shall be revised or amended, or the provisions thereof extended

by reference to its title only."'74 By guessing that the language
forbidding extension was inserted because the provisions of the
first type ".

.

. as construed by the courts were not deemed suffi-

cient to carry out the broad purpose of such restriction, and to
prevent the mischief existing and anticipated . . .- 75 from referential legislation, some courts -have held that they prevent altogether incorporation of substantive terms but not of provisions
7
that set out mere methods of procedure. Although prima facie
the construction as regards substantive terms appears to be close
to literal, when the primary effect of an incorporation by reference
is remembered it is seen to be a very liberal interpretation indeed.
In truth it is a distortion, when as in the actual cases the new act
incorporates a former one by reference because it then does not
extend the incorporated act as such. The cases that hold that
the effect of the second type in the usual case, that of adoption
of "terms" by reference in no way differs from that of the first
seem to be logically and verbally correct; that is, that they do
prohibit extending already existing statutes by reference, but do
77
not prevent extending in that manner the referring statute itself.
73

These provisions do not apply to implied amendments, People v.
Mahaney, (1865) 13 Mich. 481; or to independent acts which in effect but
not expressly amend by addition, Timm v. Harrison, (1884) 109 II. 593.
74Alabama, constitution, art. IV, sec. 45; Arkansas, constitution, art. V,
sec. 23; Colorado, constitution, art. V, sec. 24; Kentucky, constitution, sec.
51; Montana, constitution, art. V, sec. 25; New Mexico, constitution, art.
IV, sec. 18; North Dakota, constitution, art. II, sec. 64; Oklahoma, constitution, art. V, sec. 57; Pennsylvania, constitution, art. III, sec. 6; Wyoming,75 constitution, art. III, sec. 26.
State v. Armstrong, (1925) 31 N. M. 220, 258-259, 243 Pac. 333.
7OSt. Louis and San Francisco R. v. Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co.,
(C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1903) 121 Fed. 276; Denver Circle R. R. v. Nestor, (1887)
10 Colo. 403, 15 Pac. 714; White v. Loughborough, (1916) 125 Ark. 57,
188 S. W. 10; Carroll v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., (1916) 28 Idaho 466, 154
Pac. 985.
77See Savage v. Wallace, (1910) 165 Ala. 572, 51 So. 605; Lyman v.
Ramey, (1922) 195 Key. 223, 242 S. W. 21, emphasizing that the first and
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For what is extension of already existing statutes but amendment
of them ?
In addition to the states which have constitutional prohibitions of the sorts just discussed, there are two in which the
provisions comprise a third type by providing that in enacting
a new statute, if all or any part of an existing statute is adopted,
it shall be inserted in full in the new act.7 8 Plainly these prohibitions are aimed at the practice of inserting by mere reference
the provisions of other laws into even an original law as it is
being enacted. But in both states the courts, on the ground of
practical expediency 79 have refused to give them literal effect.
Instead, while they have held that a referential incorporation of
substantive provisions is forbidden, they have decided that a new
act, if substantively complete in itself, may adopt rules of construction or modes of procedure for carrying out its objects or
80
applying its standards by reference to other statutes, if the

reference is certain 8' and the content and effect of the material
second types of provisions were intended "to prevent the same type of
abuse." In Quinlan v. Houston & Tex. Cent. Ry., (1896) 89 Tex. 356, 34
S. W. 738, where the referring act in terms "extended" the old act, the court
treated it as being incorporated into the referring one to avoid violation of a
constitutional provision of the first type.
7SNew York constitution, art. III, sec. 17; New Jersey, constitution,
art. IV, sec. 7 (4). (North Dakota, constitution, art. II, sec. 64 has been
said to be of this type in State v. Armstrong, (1925) 31 N. M. 220, 249, 243
Pac. 333, but is ambiguous and apparently has not been construed by the
North Dakota court. It follows: "No bill shall be passed which shall be
revised or amended, nor the provisions thereof extended or incorporated in
any other bill by reference to its title only, but so much thereof as is revised, amended or extended or so incorporated shall be re-enacted and published at length.")
79See People ex rel. Everson v. Lorillard, (1892) 135 N. Y. 285, 291,
31 N. E. 1011.
S0 People ex rel. Commrs. v. Banks, (1876) 67 N. Y. 568; Curtin v.
Barton, (1893) 139 N. Y. 505, 34 N. E. 1093. To say, as the court did in the
Banks Case at p. 575, that "by such a reference the general [procedural]
statute is not incorporated into or made a part of the [referring] special
statute," is so much subterfuge. See also Campbell v. Board of Pharmacy,
(1883) 45 N. J. L. 241, 244-245, aff'd (1885) 47 N. J. L. 347, and cf. State
v. McNeal, (1886) 48 N. J. L. 407, 5 Atl. 805.
SlIn Matter of Becker v. Eisner, (1938) 277 N. Y. 143, 13 N. E. (2d)
747, a general reference appeared in the following form: "All laws applicable
or which may be applicable." On p. 150 the court said: "This reference to
'all laws' . . . is entirely too vague, and to permit it to pass as proper legislation would in effect nullify the constitution. . . . For this case the petitioner seeks only reference to article 33-A of the Education Law, but the
act is not so limited-all laws-what laws? Nobody knows and nobody
can tell with any certainty, although we may guess that none will turn up
except article 33-A as applicable to the Board of Education. There is the
provision 'all laws applicable'-too vague to be good."
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adopted is within the assumable knowledge of the legislature at
the time the new law is enacted. 2
Although salutary enough, all of this has been done in the
name of the legitimated offspring of legislative intent, a judicially fabricated constitutional purpose or policy.8 3 Perusal of
the record of judicial experience in applying these constitutional
prohibitions of legislation by reference leads one to concur with
a judge's declaration in a New York case that
"A provision of the fundamental law which attempts to regulate
the form in which the legislative will is to be expressed in the
enactment of laws is difficult of a just and reasonable application
in all cases, and is at best of very doubtful utility ....

-14

It will have been apparent that the courts have never given
these state constitutional restrictions upon referential legislation
rigid effect because they believe that to do so would work great
if not intolerable inconvenience for the legislatures and would
render the statutes unnecessarily voluminous. A single virtue of
incorporation by reference, that it tends to avoid encumbering
the statute book with "useless repetition and unnecessary verbiage,"' has to them justified its preseriiation as a legislative device.
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINTS

In federally united countries such as the United States,
Canada and Australia, referential legislation raises additional
problems. Both practical and theoretical characteristics of federalism contribute to them, comprising first the mutual tendency
of the associated local governments to adopt laws from each
other and that of the local and central governments to do likewise, especially in the field of economic and social legislation,
and second the phenomena of separate sovereignty of the federated units and division of governmental power between them
on the one hand and the central government on the other.
82De Agostina v. Parkshire Ridge Amusements, (1935) 155 Misc. Rep.
518, 5523-524, 278 N. Y. 622.
3In Taylor v. Taylor, (1865) 10 Minn. 107, 121 (Gil. 81, 93) Wilson
C. J., said: "The rules applicable in the construction of constitutions are not
different in this respect from those that govern in the construction of
statutes ....
In seeking the intention of the legislature, there are certain
rules that have been accumulated by experience. . . ." See also People
ex rel. Commrs. v. Banks, (1876) 67 N. Y. 568, 575-576; People ex rel.
N. Y. Elec. Lines Co. v. Squire, (1888) 107 N. Y. 593, 602, 14 N. E. 820,
for this approach to the particular sort of constitutional provision here being
considered.
84
1n People ex rel. Everson v. Lorillard, (1892) 135 N. Y. 285, 288,
31 N. E. 1011.
• See Binghampton Bridge, (1865) 3 Wall. (U.S.) 51, 18 L. Ed. 137.
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Where not restrained by some constitutional limitation there
is nothing to prevent any legislature, federal or local, from adopting precepts from the laws of any associated legislature by reference. In the United States the difficulties arise from certain
provisions in state constitutions"6 and from a generally accepted
theory of the nature of legislative power. The chief difficulty of
a peculiarly federal nature relates to delegability of legislative
power. Whatever its true doctrinal foundation, one of the most
firmly established principles of United States constitutional law is
that, subject to certain limited exceptions, 7 legislative power canS6They have been just discussed in the text of this article. It is obvious
that the first type as generally construed cannot prevent adoption of precepts
from the laws of other states or of Congress. Such provisions refer only to
revision or amendment of some law already passed by the referring legislature itself: In re Burke, (1923) 190 Cal. 326, 212 Pac. 193 (stating that the
constitutional provision "refers only to the revision or amendment of some
law already enacted by our state legislature") ; People v. Frankovich, (1923)
64 Cal. App. 184, 221 Pac. 671. Contra, Commonwealth v. Dougherty,
(1909) 39 Pa. Super. 338, purportedly distinguished but in effect overruled by
Commonwealth v. Alderman, (1923) 275 Pa. St. 483, 119 Atl. 551. As
observed supra in the text, the courts are thus far divided on whether the
second type has any different effect than the first concerning referential
adoption of a state's own prior laws. In the case of previous acts of Congress
and of other states, there is even stronger ground logically for concluding
that adoption by reference is not thereby forbidden: to wit, the fact that
the legislatures concerned are respectively in different sovereignties. The
legislature of Minnesota cannot incorporate its statute into, so as to extend,
an act of Congress or of another state. The supreme court of New Mexico
has, however, by single-eyed devotion to the so-called "mischief" rule (the
rule in Heydon's Case, (1584) 3 Co. 7a), absurdly concluded that an adoption into a statute of that state of certain provisions of the National Prohibition Act by a specific reference was a violation of the state's constitutional
proscription against extension by reference. State v. Armstrong, (1925) 31
N. M. 220, 243 Pac. 333 (on re-hearing). See also Commonwealth v.
Dougherty, (1909) 39 Pa. Super. 338. The third type has been held by
the courts of both New York (Darweger v. Staats, (1935) 267 N. Y. 290,
196 N. E. 61) and New Jersey to forbid adoption of precepts from federal
and other extra-state law by reference. "The adoption," exclaimed the vicechancellor of New Jersey, ". . . of the laws of another state or of the
nation as a part of our own act was improper; it cannot be introduced into
our legislation by reference. We may adopt the spirit, but we can't make the
law by injecting into our statutes a reference to the United States Code or
Minnesota law and calling it our law :" Wilentz v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
(1934) 12 N. J. Misc. 531, 533-534, 172 At. 903. In both the New York
and New Jersey cases just cited the references were also held to involve
wrongful delegation of legislative power, but there was no confusion of the
two problems as has sometimes occurred, e.g. State v. Larson, (1932) 10
N. J. Misc. 384, 160 Ati. 556. This angle of Darweger v. Staats and
Wilentz v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. was apparently overlooked in BrabnerSmith, Incorporation by Reference and Delegation of Power-Validity of
"Reference" Legislation, (1936) 5 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 198, 222, where it is
stated that every state constitutional provision fails to "prevent reference to a
another jurisdiction."
law of
8
7E.g. delegations to municipalities by state legislatures and to federal
territories by Congress. See McBain, Delegation of Legislative Power to
Cities, (1917) 32 Pol. Sc. Q. 276; Springfield v. Thomas, (1896) 166 U. S.
707, 17 Sup. Ct. 717, 41 L. Ed. 1172.
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not be delegated."" Although no express constitutional provisions
forbid such delegation, the courts have developed the proscription
as a corollary of the doctrine of separation of powers.8 9 Obviously
this question can arise concerning referential legislation only
when the referring legislature adopts precepts from a body of law
not of its own making.
Just when does a reference confront the delegation problem
and how do the courts approach a solution? Legislative power
is exercised by enactment of laws, and "The enactment of a
law involves both the determination of what the rule shall be
and that such rule shall have the force of law." 90 When, therefore, a legislature adopts a precept merely in the existing form
in which another law-making body has already passed it there
is clearly no delegation at all. This was decided in Santee Mills
v. Query,9 where the South Carolina legislature adoptively referred to the provisions of the United States Income Tax Act
of 1921 and Acts amendatory thereto ". . . which have been
passed and approved prior to the time of approval of this Act." 92
On the other hand, if future laws, rules or regulations are included
in the adoption there is with equal clarity a delegation.
An
extreme example of an express reference of that kind was the
Nebraska statute which provided that
"Assent is hereby given to the provisions of an Act of Congress ... now pending . . ." and ". . 'the good faith of the state
of Nebraska is hereby pledged to provide funds sufficient to carry
out the provisions of said Act of Congress as hereinafter provided.' ,,94
88
See Duff and Whiteside, Delegata Potestas Non Potest Delegari; A
Maxim of American Constitutional Law, (1929) 14 Corn. L. Q. 168; Sternberg, Delegation of Legislative Authority, (1936) 11 Notre Dame Lawyer
109. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, (8th ed. 1927) 224, states that:
"One of the settled maxims of constitutional law is that the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or authority."
8
9Rottschaefer, Constitutional Law (1939) 72.
SORottschaefer, Constitutional Law (1939) 73.
91(1922) 122 S.C. 158, 115 S. E. 202. Accord, see Gibbons v. Ogden,
(1824) 9 Wheat. (U.S.) 1, 6 L. Ed. 23; Florida v. Mellon, (1926) 273
U. S. 12, 47 Sup. Ct. 265, 71 L. Ed. 511; Matter of Kinney, (1921) 53 Cal.
App. 792, 200 Pac. 966.
02-Santee Mills v. Query, (1922) 122 S.C. 158, 168, 115 S.E. 202.
13See inter alia Clark & Murnell v. Port of Mobile, (1880) 67 Ala. 217;
State v. Holland, (1918) 117 Me. 288, 104 At. 159; Scottish Union &
Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Phoenix Title & Trust Co., (1925) 28 Ariz. 22, 235 Pac.
137. The few cases that are contra give no clear reasons for so holding.
See People ex rel. Pratt v. Goldfogle, (1926) 242 N. Y. 277, 151 N. E.
432; Commonwealth v. Alderman, (1923) 275 Pa. St. 483, 119 AU. 551. For
a general discussion, see (1935) 33 Mich. L. Rev. 597.
D4This statute was held to be an unconstitutional delegation of legisla-
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Less extreme, but equally delegations, are the references that expressly include the adopted measure and its future amendments.
So also are those that simply include the adopted measure "and
amendments thereto" when at the time of the reference no such
amendments yet exist; but not necessarily if amendments have
previously been made, since in the latter case the court is free by
construction to avoid unconstitutionality by saying that only the
ones previously made were intended to be included. 5
When a referring act fails to state expressly in any manner
the scope of the adoption in regard to futurity, resort must be
had to interpretation and thus to the so-called rule in Jones v.
Dexter. It will be recalled that under that rule the particularity
or generality of the reference determines whether the reference
is intended to include the adopted precept only as it exists at
the time of the reference or also as it may be amended from time
to time thereafter." Remembered also will be the fact that this
rule, like any other "rule" of statutory construction, is susceptible to being dubbed a "mere canon of construction" and jettisoned
in the name of legislative intent.
There have been several cases in which the references were
to future legislation of Congress or another state, where the
line between delegation and non-delegation was not as easily
discernible as in the Nebraska statute described above. Decisions
in these cases turn upon the same criteria that determine the
question of delegation of legislative power generally. 7 Professor Rottschaefer states:
"The general rule

..

,

is that it [a state legislature] may not

confer on the authorities of another state, or of the United States,
the power to determine what shall be the rule in force in the
state, or condition changes in its rule on changes in rules enacted
by other states or the United States."9
tive power in Smithberger v. Bannin, (1935) 129 Neb. 651, 660-661, 262
N. W. 92. There is, of course, no delegation when a reference is made to
other laws that may be enacted by the same legislature. See Robertson v.
Langford, (1928) 95 Cal. App. 414, 273 Pac. 150.
95E.g., In re Burke, (1923) 190 Cal. 326, 212 Pac. 193; State v. Webber,
(1926)6 125 Me. 319, 133 At. 738.
9 In applying that rule if the result would be an invalid delegation there
should be a presumption that no adoption of future amendments was intended. State v. Webber, (1926) 125 Me. 319, 133 At. 738; Santee Mills v.
Query, (1922) 122 S.C. 158, 115 S.E. 202.
97For discussion of them see Jacoby, Delegation of Powers and Judicial
Review, A Study in Comparative Law, (1936) 36 Col. L. Rev. 871; BrabnerSmith, Incorporation by Reference and Delegation of Power-Validity of
"Reference" Legislation, (1937) 5 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 198, 204.
9SRottschaefer, Constitutional Law (1939) 79, citing Opinion of the
justices, (1921) 239 Mass. 606, 133 N. E. 453; State v. Gauthier, (1922)

REFERENTIAL LEGISLATION

But it is not a delegation when the legislature merely conditions
the operation and duration of a statute on the action of the legislature of another state or of Congress.
The line drawn in the cases, taken as a whole, making this
distinction between wrongful delegation and a proper conditional
enactment is up to now shadowy and non-definitive. In all of
them, however, emphasis is placed on whether the reference to
the external standard is or is not merely to an extrinsic fact
which in no way substitutes the legislative discretion of the other
legislature as to what is to be the law for that of the one making the reference. If it is there is no delegation. For example,
a Minnesota act which provided that it should remain in effect
only so long as a federal statute remained in effect was on this
basis definitely sustainable. 9 But it is difficult to follow the
court which on the same ground upheld an act of New York
which measured fees payable by a foreign insurance company
doing business there by corresponding fees which might be
charged New York companies from time to time under the law
of the state of its origin. 00
In recent years there has been a type of statute before
Canadian provincial courts in which several of the problems
already herein discussed have been intrinsic. The Saskatchewan
121 Me. 522, 118 At. 380; Darweger v. Staats, (1935)

267 N. Y. 290,

196 N. E. 61. The courts fail to make any distinction between attempted
adoption of future federal legislation and administrative rulings. See Note
(1934) 11 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 601, 607. On the question of delegation of
legislativ'e power to a body of the legislature's own creation, see (1936)
15 Oregon L. Rev. 260.
09State v. Andrew Brothers, (1919) 144 Minn. 337, 175 N. W. 685.
Plainly this sort of a reference does not incorporate the foreign statute into
the state act: State ex rel. Tex. Co. v. Dickinson, (1910) 79 N. J. L.
292, 75 Atl. 803. On power to legislate conditionally see Cargo of Brig
Aurora v. United States, (1813) 7 Cranch'(U.S.) 382, 3 L. Ed. 378; Field
v. Clark, (1892) 143 U. S. 649, 12 Sup. Ct. 495, 36 L. Ed. 294; 3. W.
Hampton Jr. & Co. v. United States, (1928) 276 U. S. 394, 48 Sup. Ct.
348, 72 L. Ed. 624; People v. Klinck Packing Co., (1915) 214 N. Y. 121,
138-140, 108 N. E. 278; Powell, Separation of Powers, (1912) 27 Pol. Sc.
Quart. 125, 138-140. The Oklahoma Unemployment Compensation Act,
which provides that it shall cease to be operative in the event that title
IX of the Federal Social Security Act is declared invalid, has recently been
held not a delegation of legislative function to the Supreme Court of the
United States, but "simply a legislative determination of future applicability
of the act dependent upon a contingency." Gibson Prod. Co. v. Murphy,
(1940) 186 Okla. 714, 100 P. (2d) 453, 8 U. S. Law Week 477.
'(o'People v. Fire Association of Philadelphia, (1883) 92 N. Y. 311,
aff'd sub nom. Philadelphia Fire Ass'n v. New York, (1886) 119 U. S. 110,
7 Sup. Ct. 108, 30 L. Ed. 342.
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Livestock and Livestock Products Act, 1930,101 section 2 read as
follows:
If and in so far as any provision of an Act of the Parliament
of Canada intitled the Live Stock and Live Stock Products Act,
and the amendments thereof and the regulations thereunder heretofore enacted or made, is within the legislative authority of the
province and outside that of the Dominion of Canada, sutch provision shall have the force of law in Saskatchewan, and, unless
otherwise enacted by the Legislature of Saskatchewan, shall be
and remain in full force and effect therein to all intents and purposes whatsoever, until the same is repealed by the Dominion
Parliament or revoked by the Governor-General in Council, as
the case may be.' 02
In Rex v. Zaslavsky' 03 the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan
was unanimously of the opinion that the federal act to which
the reference was made in the above act was ultra vires the
Canadian Parliament in so far as it attempted to control and
regulate sales which began and ended within the province, since
section 92 (13) of the British North America Act, 1867, confides
legislative jurisdiction over property and civil rights in the
province exclusively to the provincial legislature. The court divided, however, on whether the reference in sec. 2 of the provincial act constituted a valid incorporation of terms from the
federal act or an unconstitutional attempt to confer an exclusively
provincial power on the Dominion Parliament. The majority
stated its reasons for construing the provision to be the latter
in somewhat summary fashion :104
When the provincial Legislature says that Federal legislation
and regulations made thereunder which are ultra vires of Parliament shall have the force of law in Saskatchewan there is no
suggestion of legislation by incorporation or reference. It is
simply, in my opinion, an attempt ex post facto to give jurisdiction
to Parliament which it does not possess. Further if it had been
the intention of the Legislature to incorporate the provisions of
the Federal Act and regulations by reference, why and by what
power could those provisions and regulations so incorporated have
been subject to repeal by the Dominion Parliament? In both instances there has been an attempt to enlarge the jurisdiction of
1olSaskatchewan, Rev. Stat. 1930, ch. 151. See also Animal Husbandry
Act, Manitoba, Statutes 1933, ch. 1, sec. 106 (held invalid in Rex v. Brodsk.y,
[1936] 1 W. W. R. 177, applying Rex v. Zaslavsky [1935] 2 W. W. R. 34.
[1935] 3 D. L. R. 788 (Sask.) ; Dairy Act, Manitoba, Statutes 1935, ch.
10, sec.2 26.
10 Italics by the writer.
103[1935] 2 W. W. R. 34, [1935] 3 D. L. R. 788 (Sask.) (The British
North America Act is the Canadian federal constitution.)
104[1935] 2 W. W. R. 34, 39-40, [1935] 3 D. L. R. 788.
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Parliament or to surrender jurisdiction belonging exclusively to
the province .. . It might further be pointed out that by a wellestablished rule of construction 'where a statute is incorporated
by reference into a second statute the repeal of the first statute by
a third does not affect the second, .... This rule would apply
a fortiori to legislation by one legislative body incorporating the
enactments of another legislative body by reference. 100
Although the construction thus placed upon the language of
sec. 2 of the Saskatchewan statute by the majority of the court
was possible, there are several grounds for contending that it
was improbable and unwarranted. As far as the law reports show
there was no extrinsic evidence of the legislature's actual intent
before the court. Any intent ascribed to that body was thus
properly, it is supposed, to be discovered within the statute itself
by use of established techniques. 10

7

When relevant techniques

are applied some fairly reliable guide posts are discernible in this
instance. In the first place the form of words is a typical incorporation by reference expressly negativing delegation' 018 and, as
Mr. justice Martin pointed out in his dissenting opinion, has
plain meaning. Second, there is a well-settled presumption, with
which courts usually approach points of statutory interpretation
upon which constitutionality turns, that the legislature acted with
a full knowledge of the constitutional scope of its competence 09
and "contemplated such matters only as were within its power. 11 0
And third, this presumption is far from being rebutted by the
makeweight argument in the majority opinion to the effect that
(a) because the provincial legislature expressly stipulated that its
I(,Citing Clarke v. Bradlaugh, (1881) 8 Q. B. D. 63, 69, 51 L. J.Q. B. 1.
"',See dissenting opinion, Rex v. Zaslavsky, [1935] 2 W. W. R. 34, 44,
[19351 3 D. L. R. 788, where Martin J. A. said: "It may well be that the
method adopted by the Legislature in enacting that The Live Stock and
Live Stock Products Act of the Dominion and the regulations made thereunder in so far as they are outside the jurisdiction of the Dominion and
within the jurisdiction of the province 'shall have the force of law in Saskatchewan,' is objectionable because the enactment does not set out what
portions of the Act and what portions of the regulations fall within the
category referred to; and it may well be that it would lead to greater certainty if the provincial statute were more explicit and set out in detail the
sections of the Dominion Act and the regulations which are to be the law
of the province; but I know of no authority which would warrant the court
in refusing to give effect to the legislation for this reason. The language
used in the enactment makes very plain the intention of the Legislature and
effect must be given to that intention."
1o7See Willis, Statute Interpretation in a Nutshell, (1938) 16 Can. Bar
Rev. 1; Nutting, Ambiguity of Unambiguous Statutes, (1940) 24 MINNESOTA
LAW REvIEW 509.

lOsSee first two phrases italicized in text of statute quoted above.
0'Hewson v. Ontario Power Co., (1905) 36 Can. S. C. R. 596, 607.
11°Scott v. Scott, (1891) 4 B. C. R. 316, 319.
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act would operate only until the federal measure referred to was
repealed by Parliament and (b) because there is a rule that a
term incorporated by reference is not repealed by a later repeal of
the law from which it was adopted, the necessary conclusion was
that the Saskatchewan lawmaker intended not to incorporate the
terms of the federal act but to delegate to Parliament an exclusively provincial power. That was hardly a strong argument. Both in
the United States, as shown above, and in the British Commonwealth, it has long been elementary that a reference to an extrinsic
fact of essentially the same sort as that involved in this instance,
action by another governmental body, is a proper method of conditioning the operation of a statute, and delegates no legislative
power."' That has been law ever since the decision of the Judi12
cial Committee of the Privy Council in The Queen v.Burrah
in 1878, at the least. It is respectfully suggested that the desertion
of relevant presumptions in the majority interpretation in Rex
v. Zaslavsky perhaps indicates a lack of judicial sympathy with
3
the purpose for which the legislation under review was passed."1
The dissenting opinion is much easier to justify as an interpretation as distinguished from a repeal by "judicial legislation."
The problem of delegation of legislative power thrusts itself
into a consideration of a statute of the kind now being discussed,
regardless of whether it is construed as an attempted abdication
of provincial power to the federal Parliament or as merely an
incorporation by reference, since if an incorporation expressly
or impliedly adopts the other legislature's future precepts as its
own, there is, as has been seen, a delegation. Such a delegation
would be wrongful in the United States under the maxim delegatus
non potest delegare. Would it be bad in Canada under that or
any other doctrine? A commentator on Rex v. Zaslavsky has
said, in part :114
Even assuming that the Saskatchewan legislation in question
amounts to a delegation of the purest kind it is by no means certain that any constitutional impropriety is involved. Provincial
legislative powers are "not in any sense to be exercised by dele1"See also comment by Ian G. Wahn on Rex v. Zaslavsky in (1936)
14 Can. Bar Rev. 353, 354, citing Russell v. The Queen, (1882) 7 App. Cas.
829, 51 L. J. P. C. 77; Re Canada Temperance Act, [1935] S. C. R. 494,
[1935] 3 D. L. R. 641.
132(1878) 3 App. Cas. 889. This is one point at least on which decisions
of "American" courts can be given weight in the Dominion. Cf. Haines,
Judicial Review of Legislation in Canada. (1915) 28 Harv. L. Rev. 565, 586.
"3Cf. Willis, Statute Interpretation in a Nutshell, (1938) 16 Can. Bar
Rev. 1, 18 et seq.
114(1936) 14 Can. Bar Rev. 353, 355.
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gation from or as agents of the Imperial Parliament. 115 The
maxim delegatus non potest delegare consequently has no application. "Within these limits of subjects and area the local legislature is supreme, and has the same authority as the Imperial Parliament, or the Parliament of the Dominion, would have had under
like circumstances to confide to a municipal institution or body
of its own creation authority to make by-laws or resolutions as
to subjects specified in the enactment, and with the object of
carrying the enactment into operation and effect."
After referring to several cases in all of which the courts have
upheld delegation to bodies of the legislatures' "own creation,"' 1 6
he remarked :117
"To the writer the problem confronting the courts in these
cases cannot be distinguished from that presented to the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal. It is submitted that the question is
not altered by saying that the board or commission is the creature
of the legislature. Can we not regard Parliament as the creature
of the provincial legislature ad hoc?"" s
With deference, the answer to the learned commentator's
question probably is "No." It is true that the Canadian constitution differs from that of the United States by not containing
an expression of the separation of powers dogma from which to
infer the maxim forbidding delegation. Also, it has been held
in Hodge v. The Queen that the provincial legislatures have their
powers devolved 9 from the Imperial Parliament, not delegated,
11'Citing Hodge v. The Queen, (1884) 9 App. Cas. 117, 132, 53 L. J.
P. C. 1.
"',Citing In re Lewis, (1918) 13 Alta. L. R. 423 [1918] 2 W. W. R. 681,
41 D. L. R. 1; Literary Recreations Ltd. v. Sauve, (1932) 46 B. C. R. 116,
[1932] 3 WV.W. R. 123, [1932] 4 D. L. R. 553; Standard Sausage Co. Ltd.
v. Lee, (1933) 47 B. C. R. 411, [1934] 1 W. W. R. 81 [1934] 1 D. L. R.
706; In re Gray, (1918) 57 Can. S. C. R. 150, [1918] 3 W. W. R. 111, 42
D. I. R. I.
11(1936) 14 Can. Bar Rev. 353, 355-356. See similar argument in
Shannon, Delegated Legislation, (1928) 6 Can. Bar Rev. 245.
""'The same commentator in (1936) 14 Can. Bar Rev. 353, 357 cited
Lord's Day Alliance of Canada v. Attorney-General for Manitoba, [1925]
A. C. 384 as authority for the proposition that the Dominion Parliament can
delegate to a provincial legislature power to repeal a federal act. Careful
reading, however, shows, that the case merely upheld a provincial act enactment of which had been by a Dominion act made the condition subsequent
of the operation of the latter act within the province. The provincial legislature had competence to pass its act, as it concerned the "civil rights" aspect
of Sunday observance. The court made itself clear that it did not approve
any idea that the Dominion Parliament could by delegation "give the force
of law to legislation passed by a provincial legislature professing to do what
a province under its own powers of legislation cannot do," viz. legislate on
a subject within exclusive federal competence. See [1925] A. C. 384,
393-394, 94 L. J. P. C. 84.
IlOAs distinguished from "delegated."
The Imperial Parliament by
devolution transferred plenary power, including its power to delegate. See
Riddell, Delegation of Powers of Parliament, (1926) 4 Can. Bar Rev. 429.
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and therefore would not be limited by that maxim if it did have a
place in the Canadian scene. And as Professor John Willis has
recently demonstrated in the course of his excellent article, 20
on administrative law and the British North America Act, the
latest pronouncement of the judicial Committee, in Shannon z.
Lower Mainland Dairy Products Board'2 '

has dispelled

any

doubt that a provincial legislature can, under the doctrine of
supremacy of Parliament, make a complete delegation, to the
extent of abdication, to its own subordinate body. It may thus be
admitted that the non-delegation doctrine per se does not prevent
delegations of legislative power by a provincial government to
another provincial legislature or to Parliament by regarding such
body as "the creature of the provincial legislature ad hoc." But
these delegations will encounter serious obstacles both in unwritten
yet fundamental limitations which exist in the very nature of
federalism and in the written constitution, the British North
America Act, itself.
In reason there is a vast difference between a legislature
conferring law-making power upon a subordinate body created
by itself "within its appointed sphere" and which is within its
ultimate if not for the moment immediate control and transferring
that power to a coordinate independent legislature, creation
of which is completely outside of its power and over which it has
no control whatever. As between provincial legislatures the latter
would mean permitting abdication of the exclusive right and
avoidance of the exclusive duty of formulating the local policy to
be pursued within the territory of the province. In other words,
the provincial legislature would be permitted to shirk the primary
task for which it was created, as a constituent of a federal union,
that of functioning as the exclusive representative legislature
within the province concerning specified subjects. That would
be carrying delegation beyond all limit suggested by the facts
and the opinion in both Hodge v. The Queen and the Shannon
case.
It is true of course that a province has exclusive power
under the British North America Act to amend its own constitution by statute. 12 2 But it is probably restricted to changing the
formal framework and mechanics of its government and unable
12OAdministrative Law and the British North America Act, (1939)
Harv. L. Rev. 251.
121[1938] A. C. 708, 107 L. J. P. C. 115.
l22 British North America Act 1867, sec. 92 (1).
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to alter fundamental functional principles, such as representative
government and the measure of provincial autonomy in a federated
state. 12 3 Moreover, the decision in Hodge v. The Queen neither
rested upon 124 nor in any way enlarged the power of a provincial
legislature to change its own constitution. As Viscount Haldane
has put it (in the course of his opinion in In re Initiative and
Referenidum Act

2

5

after holding on another ground that a pro-

vincial legislature cannot change its constitution functionally so as
to enable law-making power to be exercised directly by the electorate instead of by the representative legislature) :
"Section 92 of the Act of 1867 entrusts the legislative power
in a Province to its Legislature, and to that Legislature only.
No doubt . . . a Provincial Legislature in Canada could, while

preserving its own capacity intact, seek the assistance of subordinate agencies, as .. . done in Hodge v. The Queen . . .; but

it does not follow that it can create and endow with its own
capacity a new legislative power not created by the Act to which
it owes its own existence."' 126
This remark would apply a fortiori to an attempt by one provincial legislature to create ad hoc as a new legislative power the
legislature of a sister province and endow it with the former's
own capacity.
When, as was held in Rex v. Zaslavsky, the provincial legislature attempts to delegate a legislative power which the British
North America Act has expressly distributed to it exclusively, it
encounters an even higher hurdle: it runs counter to the very
essence of federalism-embodiment within the organic act of
union of a division of governmental powers between the central
and local governments. It follows that once the majority of the
court construed the Saskatchewan act as they did its unconstitutionality followed inevitably as a legislative attempt by delegation to redistribute the subject matters of legislation as between
provincial and federal competence. 2 7 In other words, it was in
result an attempt by the Saskatchewan legislature to amend sections 91 and 92 of the British North America Act. The significance of Lord Atkin's phraseology in the Shannon Case should not
12aRex ex rel. Brooks v. Ulmer, (1922) 19 Alta. L. R. 12, [1923]
1 W.2 W. R. 1, [1923] 1 D. L. R. 304.
1 4Powell v. Apollo Candle Co., Ltd., (1885) 10 App. Cas. 282, 54
L. J.P. C. 7. See also Isaacs J., Baster v. Ah Way, (1909) 8 C. L. R.
(Aus.) 626, 643.
25[19191 A. C. 935. 88 L. J.P. C. 142.
126[1919] A. C. 935, 945, 88 L. J. P. C. 142.
l27See also McGee v. Pooley, (1931) 44 B. C. R. 338, [1931] 3
W. W. R. 65, 140, [19311 4 D. L. R. 475.
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be overlooked: "Within its appointed sphere128 the provincial legislature is as supreme as any other parliament."129 It should be
unnecessary to remark that "its appointed sphere" does not include either warping the unwritten principles of the federal scheme
or amending the written text of the federal constitution. 30 The
soundness of Lord Watson's unreported dictum in C.P.R. v.
Parish of Notre Dame de Bonsecours11 cannot be gainsaid:
"The Dominion cannot give jurisdiction or leave jurisdiction
within the province. The provincial parliament cannot give legislative jurisdiction to the Dominion Parliament. If they have it,
either one or the other of them, they have it by virtue of the Act
of 1867. I think we must get rid of the idea that either one or
other can enlarge the jurisdiction of the other or surrender
jurisdiction."
Of course, if Canada were a unitary state like the Union of
South Africa with all of the legislative power vested in the union
government and the provincial legislatures existing merely as its
subordinates, the Dominion Parliament would be able to delegate
13 2
to them legislative power on any subject.
From what has just been said it must be concluded that when
a statute of a Canadian provincial legislature or of the Dominion
Parliament exercising an exclusive power contains a reference
which either expressly or impliedly adopts the future laws, rules
or regulations of the other or, also, in the case of the former,
of another provincial legislature, the reference is invalid. The
Canadian law on this question thus appears to reach approximately
the same position as that of the United States despite an entirely
different point of departure.'3 3
12SItalics by the writer.
129 Shannon v. Lower Mainland Dairy Products Board, [1938] A. C.

708, 722, 107 L. J. P. C. 115.
130"Obviously sec. 92, subsec. 1, [of the B. N. A. Act] was never intended to give provincial legislatures power to alter the line of demarcation

as laid down in sections 91, 92 and 93. The fixing of that line was un-

doubtedly part of the constitution of Canada as a whole, not part of the
constitution of a province by itself." Stuart J. A. in Rex v. Ulmer ex rel.
Brooks, (1922) 19 Alta. L. R. 12, 23, [1923] 1 W. W. R. 1, [1923] 1

D. L. R. 304.
131[1899] A. C. 367, 68 L. 3. P. C. 54, as recorded in Lefroy, Canada's

Federal System (1913) 70. Cf. Darweger v. Staats, (1935) 267 N. Y.
290, 311, 196 N. E. 61, where Lehman 3. said: "The Legislature of the
state of New York, like the Congress of the United States, is impotent to
enlarge
or restrict the field of its own powers."
1 32
See Marshall's Township Syndicate, Ltd. v. Johannesburg

Con-

solidated Investment Co. Ltd., [1920] A. C. 420, 89 L. J. P. C. 57.

133Cf. as to comparative development concerning delegation of legis-

lative power to administrative bodies, Willis, Administrative Law and
British North America Act, (1939) 53 Harv. L. Rev. 251, 252-261. See
Section 4, Manitoba Summary Convictions Act, Manitoba, Rev. Stat. 1913
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Although the Australian federal constitution' 34 seemingly embraces the separation of powers doctrine-by in terms vesting,
or treating as vested, the legislative power in parliament, the
executive power in the King, and the judicial power in certain
courts-that doctrine has been held to be modified by that of
supremacy of parliament and by practical considerations so that
it applies only to a limited extent. 135 There is no suggestion of
separation of powers in state constitutions. 36 Consequently Hodge
v. The Queen has without difficulty been held to be law in both
Commonwealth 37 and states. 38
It is thus apparent that the question of the existence and
extent of constitutional limitations upon constituent legislatures
when referentially adopting statutory provisions from each other
must be approached from the same point of departure in Australia
as inCanada.
Probably the answer to that question is also the same in both
countries. The Australian legislatures, federal and state, may
make the operation of their measures conditional upon the discretionary action of a coordinate governmental body.'39 But it
has been held that neither the Commonwealth nor a state legislature can by delegation confer upon its own respective executive power to legislate with respect to a subject matter which
is within the other's exclusive jurisdiction under the distributive
provisions of the federal constitution. 40 From this it certainly
ch. 189, which is in part clearly an unconstitutional reference. Cf. United
Church of Canada Act, Nova Scotia, Statutes, 1924, ch. 122, sec. 2 (b),
which would be invalid if interpreted to adopt a federal act yet to be
passed 4instead of an existing document.
'3 The Commonwealth of Australia, Constitution Act, 63-64 Vict. ch.
12, secs. 1, 61 and 71.
'ISeeThe King v. Federal Court of Bankruptcy, (1938) 59 C. L. R.
(Aus.) 556, 565-567, 575-577; Evatt, The Judiciary and Administrative Law
in Australia, (1937) 15 Can. Bar Rev. 247; Fry, Australian Disregard of
Doctrine of Separation of Powers, (1933) 5 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 221.
3OCf. Attorney-General for New South Wales v. Trethowan, [1932]
A. C. 526,
101 L. J. P. C. 158.
137Victorian Stevedoring & Gen. Contracting Co., Pty. Ltd. v. Dignan,

(1931) 46 C. L. R. (Aus.) 73.
"13Powell v. Apollo Candle Co., (1885) 10 App. Cas. 282, 54 L. J.
P. C. 7.
13OBaxter v. Ah Way, (1909) 8 C. L. R. (Aus.) 626, applying The
Queen v. Burrah, (1878) 3 App. Cas. 889.
14-Cooper v. Commissioner of Income Tax, (1907) 4 C. L. R. (Aus.)

1304. In Victorian Stevedoring & Gen. Contracting Pty. Ltd. v. Dignan,
(1931) 46 C. L. R. (Aus.) 73, 121 Evatt J.said: "On final analysis ..*
the Parliament of the Commonwealth is not competent to 'abdicate' its
powers of legislation. This is not because parliament is bound to perform
any or all of its legislative powers or functions, for it may elect not to

do so; and not because the doctrine of separation of powers prevents parlia-
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follows that Commonwealth and state cannot by reference adopt
future legislation from each other in violation of those provisions.
CONCLUSION

In conclusion, in view of this survey how should the question "is referential legislation worth while" be answered? Some
critics have vehemently replied, "never," and have described the
device as the deadly sin in draftsmanship.'- Halsbury's advice
on drafting' 42 takes a slightly more moderate position:
"Referential legislation, while improper where those whose
duty it is to approve it and those who are bound by it must loo':
beyond the four corners of a statute in order to comprehend it1" '
.

. .,

is proper when the object of reference is to incorporate cer-

parts of general acts, made for and adapted
tain general acts, or
44
to incorporation.'

Many now approve of the references which Halsbury calls "proper."' 4' But those which are characterized unqualifiedly "improper"
ment from granting authority to other bodies to make laws or by-laws and
thereby exercise legislative power, for it does so in almost every statute;
but because each and every one of the laws passed by parliament must
answer the description of a law upon one or more of the subject matters
stated in the constitution. A law by which parliament gave all its lawmaking authority to another body would be bad merely because it would
fail to pass the test last mentioned." See also Evatt, Judiciary and Administrative Law in Australia, (1937) 15 Can. Bar Rev. 247, 256.
'4'W. M. Graham-Harrison has observed that this extreme attitude
flows from a mistaken idea that any statute can be self-contained: Criticisms of the Statute Book, (1935) J. Soc. Pub. Teach. Law 25-27. Cf. Minnesota Revisor of Statutes' Manual, Report of Revisor to Senate and House
of Representatives, 1941, 62, rule (2) : "Referential legislation should be
avoided. Legislators should not have to look beyond the four corners of a
bill in order to comprehend its meaning."
14231 Halsbury, Laws of England (2d ed. 1938) sec. 787. Accord, see
Thring, Practical Legislation (1902) 53-57.
'43Citing Knill v. Towse, (1889) 24 Q. B. D. 186, 195, 59 L. J. Q. B.
136. (Quoted in text supra).
14 4Adding in note, "Thus, when powers of acquiring land are to be
taken the machinery of the Lands Clauses Acts (as defined in the Interpretation Act, 1880 (52-53 Vict. ch. 63), sec. 23) is usefully embodied with
them."
' 45 See with some qualifications, Report of Select Committee of the
House of Commons 1875, Cmd. 208; Ilbert, Legislative Methods and Forms
(1901) 255; Thring, Practical Legislation (1902) 53-54; Report of Special
Committee on Drafting of Legislation, (1914) 39 A. B. A. Rep. 629, 657658; Final Report of Special Committee on Legislative Drafting, (1921)
46 A. B. A. Rep. 410, 458.
Minnesota Revisor of Statutes' Manual, Report of Revisor to Senate
and House of Representatives, 1941, 62, rule (3) is as follows: "Reference
should not be made to wholly separate acts unless the acts referred to are
general acts, made for and adopted to incorporation by reference. The incorporated general act should not be deviated from or modified. The referential legislation to be avoided consists in referring, in one act, to provisions
of another act, which do not readily lend themselves to incorporation, and
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would seem in the light of the various factors examined in this
article, to have received rather cavalier treatment by the author
of that commentary. Here as elsewhere careful examination
reveals the need of discrimination, and correct statement is relative: that the admitted disadvantages of having to derive terms
of a statute from outside may sometimes be outweighed by other
considerations and even largely obviated when safeguards are
used.
Now to summarize the factors this study has divulged to be
necessarily taken into account by the framer of a statute when
making up his mind whether to use a reference in his given case
and to indicate desirable limits and safeguards for use. 146
Greatest advantage gained by incorporating terms by reference is that the new bill may be shortened with two practical
benefits, reduction in volume of the statute books, and application of established precepts of proven worth to a new situation
with a minimum of legislative tinkering. 14 7 Balanced against these
benefits, mere inconvenience of looking "beyond the four corners" of the new bill and act should mean little, and as a screen
for fraud the device can as a practical matter largely be discounted. However, since any incorporation of terms by reference
inevitably renders them indeterminate as to the referring act, great
care should be taken to insure that they are readily and surely
determinable.1 48

Hence, very serious consideration

should be

require to be referentially modified before they can be made to harmonize
with the incorporating act." This was plainly taken from unrealistic and inadequate text book treatments of the problem.
14ORecall that "referential legislation," strictly and as discussed in this
article, does not include amendment and repeal of existing acts merely
by reference to them in a new act. Such blind amendments and repeals
breed almost nothing but evil, and, as has been seen, have been effectively
prohibited in thirty-three of the United States. See unanimous condemnation of such "Chinese puzzle" method of amendment and repeal in evidence
before Select Committee of the House of Commons 1875, cmd. 208, and
discussion by W. M. Graham-Harrison, (1935) J. Soc. Pub. Teach. L. 29.
See safeguard in this respect in Rule 4b, Rules of Minnesota House of Representatives, 1941.
147When giving evidence before the Select Committee, 1875 Cmd. 208,
Sir George Jessel said: "If you bring in a Bill with an enormous number
of clauses it is difficult to get the bill through committee, and the draftsman is compelled therefore, with a view to passing the Bill to make it a
short Bill. Making it a short Bill involves simply as much reference as
possible to former enactments. Members [take] the- opportunity of endeavoring to improve the existing law. . . ." See also Chalmers, An
Experiment in Codification, (1886) 2 Law Q. Rev. 125, 133; Craies, Statute Law
(4th ed. 1936) 26.
1"8 See typical complaint of practicing lawyer in this respect in Legislation by Reference, [1932] Scots L. T. 1. Special care should be taken
in this regard with administrative provisions since the effectiveness of legislation depends so largely upon them.
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given to the degree to which a proposed referential adoption will
render the terms of the new measure difficult to discover, unworkable, or unintelligible.
A competent draftsman will first of all if the proposed reference is to adopt an act or portion of an act examine the whole of
that act, its textual environment, construction, history and administrative application, to make sure that the adoption will
neither heap up a series of statutes, be unsuitable, nor achieve
unintended results. Having satisfied himself that serious dangers
of that sort are avoidable, he will employ at least the following
safeguards: (a) Make the reference express and clear.1 49 (b) Use
only specific reference when adopting statutory precepts with
exact citation, never mere description. There is a saying that the
strength of a statute lies in its general phrases. But Ernst Freund
showed that to be a half truth, that in some statutes general
phrases constitute weakness. 50 The foregoing analysis has demonstrated that in most statutes general references usually do so. (c)
Be explicit concerning the extent of the reference in quantity,251
and never affirmatively provide that the statutory provision referred to shall apply "so far as applicable" or "so far as practicable.' 1 5 2

(d) When necessary to adapt the adopted precepts to

the subject matter of the referential act, do so expressly in the
new bill; do not leave the task to the courts and administrative
officials. In case of administrative provisions special care in this
respect should be taken with both rules and standards."' 3 (e) As
to extent of the reference in time, displace application of the
English rule or of the rule in Jones v. Dexter or, if desirable,
of that in a general interpretation act by expressly stating in
so many words whether changes made in the incorporated law
after the date of the adoption are or are not to be included in
the reference.'5 4 (f) In countries with written or partly written
constitutions if the reference is to precepts from a body of law
not of the legislature's own making, try to avoid constitutional
difficulties by expressly declaring that an adoption by reference,
149The problem of implied references can be avoided by taking care to
avoid any casus omissus in the new act.
15OFreund, Indefinite Terms in Statutes, (1921) 30 Yale L. J. 437,
Legislative Regulation (1932) ch. VIII.
'51Cf. Craies, Statute Law, (4th ed. 1936) 202.
152Cf. Report of Special Committee on Drafting Legislation, (1914)
39 A.5 3B. A. Rep. 628, 656-657.
1 To same effect see Carr, Legislation by Reference and the Technique
of Amendment, (1940) 22 J. Comp. Leg. (3d ser.) 12, 16-18.
151'See supra notes 66 and 47.
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not a delegation, is being made and that the reference includes
only the precepts "which have been passed prior to the passage
of this act."""
Although in any case its use means careful and time-consuming search by someone, most properly by the draftsman, whether
referential legislation is worth while cannot be determined in the
abstract. After all, in each particular case it is a question of good
judgment and skill on the part of the draftsman. 15 6
1"Cf. in this respect the references in the following Manitoba acts:
(a) Pensions for the Blind Act, Manitoba, Statutes 1935, ch. 33, sec. 2
(a), "The Lieutenant-Governor-in-Council may authorize the payment of
pensions to blind persons under the conditions specified in any act of the
Dominion relating thereto or regulations made thereunder." (b) Industrial
Disputes Investigation Act 1907, chapter 20 of the Statutes of the Parliament of Canada 1907, and all amendments thereto up to and including
the said chapter 14 of 1925, shall apply to every individual dispute of the
nature defined which is within or subject to the exclusive legislative jurisdiction6 of this province."
" When making the above suggestions the author had in mind that
Chalmers, who drafted the English Bills of Exchange and Partnership
Act, once remarked that lawyers usually regard projects for improving
drafting of statutes "with the same pious shrinking as that with which
an orthodox doctor would regard a medical prescription written in English
instead of in dog Latin." Since publication of this article in the Canadian
Bar Review a lawyer correspondent has commented to the author: "I have

no faith that draftsmen will adopt your sensible advice. It seems to me
that, short of an earthquake, nothing will induce a lawyer to use the
English language in preference to 'legal English,' or to use his common
sense,-otherwise we should long ago have got rid of artificial and meaningless monstrosities like the ordinary mortgage deed and the ordinary deed
of trust in a bond issue, and draftsmen would come to see the necessity
of making special provision in every statute for such inevitable problems
as retrospective effect, contracting out, extent of protection conferred on
administrative officers, etc., etc." However, the author's experience seems
to justify less pessimism concerning his fellow disciples of Saint Ives. See review by Sir Cecil Carr in (1940) 22 J. Comp. Leg. (3d ser.) 191, of this
article as published in the Canadian Bar Review for interesting commentary
based on his experience as a parliamentary draftsman.

